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In convening the “‘Law As . . .’: Theory and Method in Legal History” 
symposium, Christopher Tomlins and Catherine Fisk invited new work on the 
theory of legal history and on the method by which legal historians do their work. 
A number of scholars from a variety of disciplines, not all of them historians or 
lawyers, were invited to offer their thoughts about reorienting legal history 
generally, and sociolegal history in particular, away from the long-dominant 
framework of “law and society” and toward a new framework that does not 
depend on a binary, or a conjunction of two distinct fields imagined as outside of 
each other. The conveners posed the idea of legal history as being the study of 
“law as . . .” about which we shall say more below. As is customary, papers were 
written and circulated. Over two days in Irvine in April 2010, we gathered to 
discuss sixteen papers divided into four panels. The exchange of ideas was 
facilitated by four discussants—John Comaroff, Robert Gordon, Morton Horwitz, 
and Christopher Tomlins—and four moderators—Catherine Fisk, Risa Goluboff, 
Ariela Gross, and Hendrik Hartog. Faculty, graduate students, and law students 
from UC Irvine and other universities also participated in the conversation. Thus, 
the symposium as it appears to you in text comprises not only the paper authors’ 
ideas, but also, through this Foreword and in the Afterword by Comaroff and 
 
* Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine. 
**Chancellor Kent Professor of Law and Legal History, Yale Law School. Professor Gordon feels 
obliged to mention that this introduction is predominantly the work of Catherine Fisk and that his 
contribution has been in the form of a few editorial suggestions. Professor Fisk demurs. 
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Tomlins, some of the ideas suggested by moderators and discussants, including 
many people in the audience.1 The division of labor between article authors, on 
the one hand, and moderators and discussants, on the other, reflects an effort to 
draw together some of the most renowned legal history scholars in the United 
States over the last thirty years with those who are newer to the field, are less well 
known to legal historians, or produce work that suggests particularly interesting 
departures from the familiar terrain of legal history in matters of either theory or 
method. 
In what follows, we explain the “law as . . .” concept of the symposium and 
introduce the papers by suggesting various ways in which they answered the call to 
contemplate legal history from the perspective of “law as . . . .” We identify the 
theoretical and methodological commonalities among the papers and suggest five 
distinct themes present in their answers to the symposium’s call. 
 
* * * 
 
Legal historians, as well as scholars of anthropology, sociology, politics, 
philosophy, and other fields who study law and the past, have long taken their 
intellectual cues from the problematic of the “law and” or “law &” theory. “Law 
and” was first grounded on Roscoe Pound’s turn-of-the-twentieth-century 
distinction between law “on the books” and law “in action” as well as Oliver 
Wendell Holmes Jr.’s statement (following the famous aphorism: “[t]he life of the 
law has not been logic: it has been experience”) that “[t]he law embodies the story 
of a nation’s development through many centuries . . . .”2 The “law and” idea was 
enlivened and extended by Legal Realism in the 1920s and 1930s, and given depth 
by the research of the law and society movement that began in the 1960s and 
continues today. From its start, the “law and” theory has explained law through its 
relations to cognate but distinct domains of action—society, culture, politics, and 
economy. “Law and” scholarship has generally described, parsed, and theorized 
the relations among these domains of action. Legal historians use “and” as a 
reminder that one should study law not as distinct from all else, as entirely self-
contained and self-generating, or as a “brooding omnipresence in the sky.”3 Thus, 
what may be a matter of rhetorical convenience becomes a crucial but largely 
unexamined ontological statement and cognitive habit. “Law and” scholarship 
perpetuates the idea that, even though law is situated in society, law is distinct 
from society and can, or must, be studied in relation to it. 
 
1. Only those whose names appear as authors should be faulted for their shortcomings; the 
ideas expressed here came from many sources. 
2. O.W. HOLMES, JR. THE COMMON LAW 1 (1923). 
3. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The common law 
is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi 
sovereign that can be identified . . . .”). 
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The “law and” theory identifies society as law’s most important 
determinative context, and makes both law and society subject to empirical study.4 
There are many methods by which empirical claims may be made in “law and” 
scholarship. In that way, “law and” has been far more ecumenical and eclectic 
than many social science and humanities disciplines in deciding how one should 
conduct social research and interpret its results. This methodological catholicism 
may help account for its enduring appeal. In introducing the live symposium, Dirk 
Hartog confessed an inclination, or experience, that may have been shared by 
many: the desire to be a sociologist/historian/lawyer at one point, an 
anthropologist/historian/lawyer at another. The law and society framework allows 
for this kind of methodological wandering over the course of a career. 
The core theory underlying “law and” is the predominance of causally 
functional and empirical accounts of law. The scholar’s job is to examine how law 
arises out of activity in the social sphere and how, in turn, law reacts back upon 
and causes changes in that sphere. The scholar must also discover patterns and 
regularities in those interactions that would ideally allow causal generalizations. 
The theory is that law is a purposive or functional activity; people create law, or 
make use of law in a particular way for a reason, and the result of these activities, 
whether intended or not, is that law becomes what it becomes and society 
becomes what it becomes. 
The “law and” framework has been a highly productive one for nearly a 
century, spurring humanities, social science, and law scholars to produce 
insightful, provocative, and canonical works on topics covering nearly the entire 
field of human endeavor. Under many different names and methodologies—
including sociological jurisprudence, law and society, law and economics, and 
empirical legal studies—“law and” scholarship pervaded a wide range of academic 
disciplines, as well as the professional education and training of lawyers and the 
work of judges. The impact of “law and” can hardly be overstated. 
The “law and” framework was as productive in legal history as in the rest of 
the academy, both in terms of its institutional impact and intellectual influence. As 
Steven Wilf 5 observes, legal historians became important members of faculties in 
many law schools and history departments and their work spilled over into 
sociology, anthropology, economics, critical theory, literature, and other fields. 
Methodological crises in many social science and humanities disciplines in the 
1990s led many scholars to embrace history as a kind of salvation. The work of 
legal historians enriched jurisprudential scholarship as well, forcing theorists and 
philosophers of law to consider social context as a far more significant feature of 
law than the jurisprudence—even the historical jurisprudence—of the nineteenth 
 
4. Some of the ideas expressed in these paragraphs have also been explored in recent years by 
Christopher Tomlins. See Christopher Tomlins & John Comaroff, “Law As . . .”: Theory and Practice in 
Legal History, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1039 (2011). 
5. See, e.g., Steven Wilf, Law/Text/Past, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 543 (2011). 
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century had allowed. 
Beginning in the late 1970s, however, critical theory produced a trenchant 
critique of the functional and empirical account of law/society relations on which 
the “law and” framework rests. Theories of causal regularities in law/society 
relations were elusive and unstable; they tended to break down under critique into 
indeterminacy marked by complexity and contingency. 
For the critics of law/society relations, it was fun to destabilize the widely 
accepted verities about the origins and function of law. It was fun to skewer the 
just-so stories that tended to dominate legal scholarship and still persist in so 
much law and economics work. Yet, scholars took the critique seriously and were 
forced to question both the theory underlying our work and the nitty-gritty of 
what we do on a daily basis. Can we make causal claims? What kind? Should we 
try? More broadly: What should we study? How much and what kind of study of 
the “social” is desirable or necessary? What is the “social” and how can we 
distinguish it from “law”? When legal historians go into the archive, what should 
we read and how should we interpret the papers we find there? Should we even be 
in the archive at all? At the most extreme, what is “history” and what is “law”? Or, 
as Norman Spaulding asks, musing on Hayden White’s suggestion that Hegel 
posited that there could be no history without law, “why put history in relation to 
law at all?”6 Does history—that is, the ability to represent reality as history—
depend on the existence of a subject constituted in relation to or, more 
specifically, as resistance to a system of law? Or, as Ritu Birla says, perhaps legal 
history as critical practice must “confront the problem of the autonomous subject 
exercising intentioned agency.”7 Graduate students and junior scholars may be 
forgiven for wondering, if the existence of subjects exercising intentional agency is 
up for grabs, whether it is worth staying in graduate school or studying history at 
all. Regrettably, critical theory produced no replacement for the problematic “law 
and” theory it had undermined. 
The “law and” theory survives, in part by default, and in part because of the 
capaciousness of the conjunctive metaphor. It has long allowed all manner of 
claims about the natures of law and history, and about the insights one might gain 
from studying law as part of other domains of human activity. The pragmatic 
usefulness of the conjunction papers over abiding doubts about the continuing 
intellectual coherence of the framework that encompasses so much sociolegal 
historical work. Careful writers know that the word “and” can hide all manner of 
sins of argumentation, vagueness, or ambiguity. Usually, an assumed shared 
cultural context gives meaning to the linking of two words by “and.” For instance, 
 
6. Norman W. Spaulding, The Historical Consciousness of the Resistant Subject, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 677, 685 (2011); see HAYDEN WHITE, THE CONTENT OF THE FORM: NARRATIVE DISCOURSE 
AND HISTORICAL REPRESENTATION 12–14 (1987). 
7. Ritu Birla, Law as Economy: Convention, Corporation, Currency, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1015, 
1036 (2011). 
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one familiar with Anglo-American culture knows what is meant when “toast” and 
“marmalade” are linked by “and” in the same sentence; others may not see the 
necessary connection between them. Thus, the linking of two words by “and” can 
seem implausible (“law and plastics”) or controversial (“law and papal 
infallibility”), depending on the cultural context. 
Aware of the difficulty of making claims about the relationship between law 
and society in the past or in the present, we still work away, trying to avoid 
making, or carefully hedging, claims about the relationship between law and 
whatever follows the ampersand. We say that the economy/society “shapes” law, 
or law “influences” the economy/society, or that law and the economy/society are 
“mutually constitutive.” Legal historians have shown that all three propositions are 
surely true in some sense, but that precision and certainty about the exact nature 
of, reasons for, or processes by which the one “has an impact on” the other are 
elusive. Indeed, the propositions are sometimes so elusive as to make one wonder 
whether anything can, or should, be said about the causal relationship between 
“law” (whatever that means) and “society” (whatever that means). If one is to 
abjure making any kind of causal claims at all, and to forswear the use of certain 
words and phrases (“caused,” “influenced,” “had an impact on,” “led to,” 
“resulted in,” etc.), one needs a new perspective on the enterprise. To the extent 
that history generally, and legal history in particular, invites or demands clear and 
verifiable claims about causal relationships between this and that (for example, 
that the creation of a right of landowners to divert water from a stream was 
motivated by a particular vision of the benefits of economic development,8 and 
led to a particular set of outcomes) a prodigious amount of work by a generation 
of scholars has made us aware that this approach to legal history, termed 
“evolutionary functionalism,”9 has serious conceptual limitations. These 
limitations were pointed out many times over the last twenty-five years, and yet 
legal historians still work away at writing about the past, even in the absence of a 
grand theory about why or how one should go about it. Of course, it is perfectly 
possible, and indeed very common, to write first-rate history uninformed by a 
grand theory. But if we want to pause now and again to think about our practice, 
we can spare time for a little theorizing about relationships between law and 
whatever follows the ampersand. 
The papers in this volume responded to an invitation to consider legal 
history through a lens other than that provided by the “law and society” or “law 
and social history” frameworks. Authors were invited to try dispensing with theory 
built from the conjunctive metaphors of “law and,” and instead reach for different 
metaphors. Instead of parsing relations between distinct domains of activity, 
 
8. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860 34–
53 (1977). 
9. See Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 59 (1984). 
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between law and what lies “outside” of it, the objective of historical research 
about law might be to imagine them as the same domain: “law as . . . .” The 
conveners deliberately extended the invitation not only to scholars of law and 
history, but also to those whose primary intellectual or disciplinary home lies in 
politics, theory, rhetoric, and anthropology. Each of these fields has experienced 
its own historical turn in the last generation, and each has had a lively and 
penetrating discourse about law that produced ideas and works that are influential 
to historians and to lawyers. 
The invitation was answered in many richly imaginative ways. The articles in 
this symposium conceptualize law variously as text, peace, politics, silence, claims, 
justice, consciousness, resistance and that which is resisted, drama, tragedy, 
enchantment, sacred ritual, spectacle, allegory, war, empire, the Crown, money, 
economy, and more. Law is imagined as these things, and, importantly, as 
antithesis. The wealth of possibilities and the subtleties in the way that law is 
imagined in these pages and, we suspect, can be imagined by others, were among 
the greatest surprises at the symposium and remain among the greatest joys of 
reading the papers in this collection. That wealth of ideas, with its promise of 
generating more ideas in the future, explains the conveners’ insistence on the 
ellipses in the symposium title: “Law As . . . .” The ellipses began as a hopeful 
invitation to consider what law is if it is not half of a conjunction. The conveners 
had no idea what might follow “law as . . . .” Now that we know what these 
symposium participants imagined law as on this occasion, we insist on the ellipses 
as a statement of principle: law can and should be imagined as many things, 
including but by no means limited to those suggested here. The invitation 
continues to you, the reader, to imagine “law as . . . .” 
Inevitably, for most of us, whether we see ourselves as scholars of both 
history and law, scholars of history who happen to study law, scholars of law who 
happen to study history, scholars in some other discipline entirely who happen to 
study history and law, or scholars who are resistant to disciplinary categorization 
altogether, these disciplines will always be something of a binary. The cognitive 
map inscribed in the brain of those teaching or trained in most contemporary 
universities invites thinking about law and history separately and as needing a 
conjunction. We use many conjunctions besides the ubiquitous ampersand; the 
most common linguistic feature to link the concepts may be “inter-” 
(interdisciplinary, intertwining, interaction, intersection, interpretation). Whatever 
the terminology, perhaps the most common and most significant methodological 
and theoretical insight of these works, and the enduring insight of the “law and” 
framework, is the importance of context in the study of law. Without knowing 
about context we can know little about law, but we should be careful in how we 
think about the relationship between context and law. We should remember to 
think about context as law and law as context. Most broadly, “as . . .” reminds and 
invites creative consciousness about our work. 
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* * * 
 
One of the advantages of legal history as compared to, say, jurisprudence, is 
the flexibility it offers scholars to see the many faces of law rather than having to 
characterize the nature of law as being all one thing or all another. While the 
discussion that follows highlights five distinct themes that unite some papers and 
distinguish others, there are at least as many theoretical and methodological 
themes that unite them all. For the sake of brevity, we identify three. First, the big 
and, by now, tedious theoretical problem (Is law ideological superstructure or is it 
foundational? Is it something mostly determined by external social change or itself 
a cause?) that vexed so much of legal history for a generation has been dismissed, 
just as one might dismiss the debate over whether the chicken preceded the egg. 
Law constitutes society and society constitutes law; as Birla says, legal historians 
see law as embedded in all else about human existence10 and, as many have noted, a 
great deal of human existence is embedded in law. Second, grand, unidirectional 
theories of causation or efforts to explain causation are absent. Legal history is not 
trying to be an empirical social science aiming to identify a series of variables and 
use the past as an experiment to prove that one or two variables produced 
particular effects. Teleological theories are out, but so are theories that insist all is 
irreducibly particular, contingent, and complex. Narrative arc matters and, thus, it 
is important to explain that somebody did something to, with, or for someone 
else, for identifiable reasons and with identifiable consequences. Contingency and 
complexity remain—one would have to be arrogant, deluded, or ignorant of a 
quarter century’s critical theory to believe that any historical event worth writing 
about was indisputably the product of only one or two prior events or 
phenomena; however, the contingency and complexity have to be pushed aside 
enough to tell a story that a reasonably literate reader can follow. Third, all the 
papers bear the imprint of the critical theory and critical histories of the last 
generation. It seems fair to say that a critical stance, with occasional aspirations to 
the redemptive possibilities of critical history, seems to be the unanimous 
theoretical commitment of these scholars, even as their methodologies vary 
widely. 
Ironically, given the universal embrace of the idea that history should be 
critical in any of the many ways in which legal histories can be critical, there was 
somewhat less critical engagement with the theories that underlie the canonical 
works than one might have expected from an invitation to rethink the theory and 
method of legal history. No one wanted to storm the citadel of Hurstian, 
Friedmanian, Horwitzian, Hartogian, or Tomlinsian history even as they have, by 
 
10. Birla, supra note 7, at 1020. 
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their methods, chosen other paths for their work.11 This is no surprise, given the 
respectfulness and modesty with which all the papers staked their theoretical and 
methodological claims. For good or ill, we have no manifesto for the next wave of 
sociolegal history. It is not that the conference conveners tried to suppress 
revolution; indeed, they almost tried to provoke it. While some of the most 
eminent and influential scholars were present, the conveners selected papers that 
gave precedence to some of those whom they thought might be characterized as 
“up-and-comers” or newer voices. With both the old guard and new wave present, 
some might have imagined a lively debate as the new generation tried to stake its 
intellectual claim by differentiating itself from the canonical works. When some of 
the presentations referred to old frameworks and intellectual exhaustion in the 
field, the conveners invited the hurling of a few bricks by suggesting, as noted 
above, that perhaps it was time for radical reorientation of the field of sociolegal 
history. Yet, what we have in the pages that follow are ruminations and invitations 
to future work, not a sharp break with the past or a call to arms for future 
scholars. During the conference someone even remarked, with a tinge of 
disappointment, that no one had tossed a grenade or tried to incite an uprising. 
For those, including the conveners, who may have arrived at the conference with 
the hopes of seeing an ancien régime toppled, the Revolution will have to wait. 
The legal-historical methods reflected in these papers are ones that make a 
virtue of pluralism, bricolage, multiple perspectives, and diverse sources. The 
conventional sources of legal history—judicial opinions, statutes, treatises, lawyer’s 
pleadings and other writings, and court records of trials and testimony—appear 
here alongside conventional sources of intellectual and social history—theorists’ 
and historians’ books and articles, news accounts, advertisements for rayon,12 and 
John Reed’s account of Pancho Villa in Mexico.13 One need not choose between 
top-down and bottom-up approaches, or between (as one of us once put it and 
Kunal Parker echoes14) internal and external legal histories. The mix of theory and 
narrative differs from one paper to the next, as it should, but everyone is still 
reading texts and examining images from the past and trying to construct a story 
out of them. 
What we do have, however, is a commitment to conscious and careful 
 
11. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973); HENDRIK 
HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA (2000); HORWITZ, supra note 8; JAMES WILLARD HURST, 
LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 
(1956); CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC (1993). 
12.  Barbara Young Welke, Owning Hazard, A Tragedy, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 693, 696–97 
(2011). 
13.  John Fabian Witt, The Dismal History of the Laws of War, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 895 (2011) 
(citing JOHN REED, INSURGENT MEXICO 142 (1914)). 
14.  Kunal M. Parker, Law “In” and “As” History: The Common Law in the American Polity, 1790–
1900, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 587 (2011). 
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scrutiny of the past. We have the joys of our practice. Archives are often fun, yet 
when we emerge from them, as Hartog said at the conference, we find ourselves 
living in historiographic time in which we struggle against past interpretations or 
against the absence of interpretations, and we feel the anxiety of influence and the 
fear of too little influence. In each of these papers we have an author bringing 
awareness to the why and how of studying the law’s past. 
 
* * * 
 
In the remaining pages of this Foreword, we weave together the symposium 
articles by identifying five different conceptions of the nature of law. The articles 
appear in an order that is intended to highlight the claims they make about what 
the authors see “law as . . . .” 
 
“Law as . . .” the Language of Social Relations 
Several of the papers advocate the importance of a quality of law that 
emphasizes its communicative aspect. Communication, of course, presupposes 
social relations and law is the medium through which people communicate with 
each other about social order. We have texts (Wilf), speech acts (Constable), local 
social relations conceptualized as “the peace” (Edwards), jurisprudential theories 
of positive law that “transform law into a product of science” in the sense of 
reason (Berkowitz), and law as irreducibly both and neither politics in history 
(Parker). All of these treat law as a particular and particularly indefinable form of 
human engagement with the others. 
Wilf’s article appears first in the symposium because it most squarely 
addresses the crucial and obvious question of theory and method: legal history is, 
in the most basic sense, the records we study (most of which are texts) and what 
we write about them (since most legal history scholarship is delivered in the form 
of a text). Except for relatively recent history, which can be studied through oral 
exchange or through watching films or listening to recordings, and except for 
those circumstances in which legal history requires study of objects (on this 
Goodrich’s paper has interesting things to say), the method of legal history is to 
read texts. Wilf reminds us that legal historians tend to fetishize texts and, riffing 
on Derrida,15 suggests that a variant of archive fever, which Wilf calls mal de texte, 
may be an occupational hazard.16 What distinguishes sociolegal history from the 
(oft-derided) form of legal history that consists of reading only cases and statutes, is 
its eclecticism about what kinds of texts should be read and, more importantly, 
 
15. JACQUES DERRIDA, ARCHIVE FEVER: A FREUDIAN IMPRESSION 91 (Eric Prenowitz 
trans., 1996). 
16. Wilf, supra note 5, at 549. 
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what aspects of human activity we hope to understand by reading the texts and 
what kind of narrative about the past we hope to write based on our reading. 
Sociolegal history derives conclusions from not just “law” texts, whatever those 
are, and not just formal law, but from material that describes more than just 
judges’ and lawyers’ opinions. Wilf points out that we easily substitute the 
conjunction “text and context” to escape from the problems of the old “law and 
society” framework, and yet we bring along the old conjunction and all its 
possibilities and limitations.17 He reminds us that the conjunction is deeply 
embedded in the way in which many of us imagine the very essence of sociolegal 
history. 
Several of the contributions to this symposium examine and theorize the 
relationship between texts and social life, showing that the relationship is 
foundational to the legal historical project. Constable notes that even the most 
formal legal texts or statements of law are speech acts that are, necessarily, social. 
One cannot separate, in her account, text from context or law from society 
because the text is a social artifact and either making or reading it is a social act.18 
Edwards highlights that the social order (the “peace”) was law, and the law was the 
social order.19 The positive law discussed in Berkowitz’s essay similarly figures 
primarily as written law, or at least stated law. He excavates Leibniz and scientific 
rationalism as a form of discourse about legitimating social relations in the 
absence of consensus on morality.20 And Parker argues that, until the turn of the 
twentieth century, when Holmes and others insisted that law was simply a way of 
talking about politics that used both arguments of logical syllogism and of 
historical continuity to legitimate claims, law was a way of arguing about claims of 
right.21 
Constable points out that sociolegal scholars, in their determination to reject 
the narrow doctrinal study of law in books that even most law schools no longer 
monolithically teach, may have overemphasized whatever comes after the 
ampersand—society, economy, polity, etc. Laws in books are, she reminds us, 
“utterances or written productions [that] are themselves acts, produced and 
circulated by different sorts of agents over time.”22 Studies of the history of law, 
like studies of the rhetoric of law, have the advantage of forcing attention on “the 
claims—explicit and implicit, past and present—to justice in legal speech [acts],” 
an emphasis on justice that she finds absent in sociolegal studies that focus solely 
 
17. Id. at 544–48. 
18. Marianne Constable, Law as Claim to Justice: Legal History and Legal Speech Acts, 1 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 631, 633–34 (2011). 
19. Laura F. Edwards, The Peace: The Meaning and Production of Law in the Post-Revolutionary United 
States, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 565, 565 (2001). 
20. Roger Berkowitz, From Justice to Justification: An Alternative Genealogy of Positive Law, 1 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 611, 615–19 (2011). 
21. Parker, supra note 14, at 587–88. 
22. Constable, supra note 18, at 633. 
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on actions, in legal scholarship that focuses solely on rules, and in legal philosophy 
that “exiles justice from its bailiwick.”23 Wilf, Constable, and Parker share an 
emphasis on law as written or spoken words. It is not just that historians (as 
opposed to archeologists) study the past by studying the written words of the 
past—though we do read and read and read; it is that the word-ness of law is one 
of its defining and most interesting features. 
Edwards, by contrast, finds significance in a highly localized, yet ubiquitous, 
concept of social relations, an inextricable intermingling of law and social order 
known as “the peace.” This was a form of law least likely to be written, codified, 
and formally systematized. It existed in contrast to the law formally promulgated 
at the state or national level. Thus, Edwards challenges the longstanding paradigm 
that law is the set of rules written in books, originating either in state or federal 
legislatures, constitutional conventions and courts, or the written or spoken work 
of lawyers and judges in treatises and formal writings. Law in the paradigmatic 
account is somewhat top-down and centralized. It originates in governmental 
bodies and is disseminated via books and written work of lawyers out to the 
people. In that account, a state/people or law/society dichotomy is easy to see. 
Law is made in the buildings holding legislatures and courts and it is recorded in 
books stored in libraries in these buildings. Society is the mass of people outside 
these buildings in homes and streets, factories and fields. Law filters out from the 
big government buildings to the smaller buildings and to the fields via the efforts 
of lawyers, police, and those who invoke law for one reason or another. Edwards 
turns the flow around depicting law as existing and, importantly, originating in a 
localized, decentralized fashion throughout the space of communal life. 
Edwards’s account of law as “the peace”—as a sense of order to life that is 
deeply situated and felt—makes a methodological and theoretical claim about the 
nature of law that is widespread and intellectually influential in the family of works 
which includes the important work of Ariela Gross on trials of racial 
determination24 and of Hendrik Hartog on marriage.25 In courts, and in every 
other forum where people make claims on or demand protection against others, 
we find law not only in what the judge says, but in what people say and, if our 
sources allow a window into it, in what they say and do outside the court as well. 
Kunal Parker and Roger Berkowitz both offer histories of law as histories of 
the philosophy of law. Their focus facilitates the redemptive project of legal 
history. Berkowitz concludes his essay by invoking “a path of redemption” offered 
by contemplation that law was once transformed into “a product of science.” 
Remembering that (and what is the historian’s job but to remember?) may 
facilitate the creation of “an art of legislation that would summon the just, the 
 
23. Id. at 640. 
24. ARIELA J. GROSS, WHAT BLOOD WON’T TELL: A HISTORY OF RACE ON TRIAL IN 
AMERICA (2008). 
25. HARTOG, supra note 11, at 10. 
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true, and the beautiful,” which is “the question for our age.”26 Parker, too, cannot 
resist the lure of ending on what he terms a positive note. Even after carefully 
chronicling an origin to the modern view that law and politics cannot be 
disentangled, and that foundational and teleological faiths are hard to find in 
modern law and history, he invokes the story of constitutional history as one of 
“ever-expanding circles of rights, freedoms, and equalities,” leading up to the 
possibility that legal recognition of same-sex marriage is “something mandated by 
the logic of history itself.”27 
Like canonical works of legal history, such as Hurst’s story of Wisconsin 
lumber businesses28 or Hartog’s account of the practices of pig keeping in 
antebellum New York,29 all of these papers locate law by identifying the ways in 
which people make claims about what they can or cannot do, or what is just or 
justifiable. Law is not only a delegation of state power to make rules that govern 
the lives of others or rights allowing the holder to call upon state power to resist, 
it is also the claiming of such powers and rights by means usually or always done 
with words. Law is the talking about social relations, either in the context of 
resolving particular disputes (Edwards and Constable), or in the effort to justify a 
system of rules in the abstract (Parker, Berkowitz), or in accounts of how those 
claims were made in the past (Wilf). Law when it is figured as a particular form of 
communication can be either intensely and necessarily local (Edwards, Gross, and 
Hartog) or it can transcend the particularity of time and place (Wilf, Berkowitz). 
Sometimes it is portrayed as being both local and transcendent at once. Law can 
be radically situated in time and place yet timeless and universal. “The peace” is 
both situated in communities in the antebellum South and, as it was articulated by 
those who lived there, it made claims to universality and abstraction: civilization, 
as they imagined it, necessarily required a certain order and certain resolution of 
disputes over behavior and control of land, things, and people. The scientific 
justification of positive law is necessary because moral pluralism undermines all 
other justifications. All of these works explore the richness of law as a form of 
communication within a social context. 
 
Law as Consciousness 
In contrast to the various conceptions of law as communication or, as we 
will see in later papers, a domain of existence or activity, there are histories in 
which law figures as a form of consciousness, or as a lens through which people 
perceive the world. In this way, law is like a particularly self-aware religion or state 
 
26. Berkowitz, supra note 20, at 630. 
27. Parker, supra note 14, at 609. 
28.  HURST, supra note 11, at 10. 
29.  Hendrik Hartog, Pigs and Positivism, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 899 (1985). 
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of mind. As consciousness, law can be imagined in many different ways. The 
articles in this symposium emphasize law as the consciousness of resistance or 
rebellion: law as the opposition or antithesis, law as that which people resist, or 
law as the source of its own resistance. Edwards’s account of “the peace” shows 
how a form of local order in the antebellum South was ultimately replaced by a 
law that initially was cast as the Other, or an outsider in the rural areas and small 
communities of the South. In the sit-ins of the civil rights movement, activists saw 
themselves, in Christopher Schmidt’s telling, as opposing or resisting law.30 Law 
was what they were avoiding, resisting, subverting, and not using or doing. What 
they were doing was trying mightily to change the law while believing that they 
were deliberately trying not to rely on lawyers and the apparatus of law to do so. 
Their conviction that to change society they had to change the law by not 
resorting to law was—if one may hazard a simplistic causal claim—the product of 
the centuries of social practice of racism as part of the social order and racial 
subordination as part of “the peace.” Jim Crow was not just culture or 
superstructure or epiphenomenal, and its dismantling was, and remains, a project 
of radical legal and social change. The student protesters in Schmidt’s telling knew 
a lot more about law than the mandarins who wrote from the confines of elite 
universities in the Northeast. 
The sit-ins were animated at least in part by the sense that attitudes of whites 
and blacks had to change. Later, that same spirit of attitudinal change became 
organized consciousness-raising sessions. Legal change was consciousness change, 
which means that law is an aspect of consciousness. Implicit in the idea of 
consciousness may also be consciousness in resistance to something or someone 
else. The sit-ins were an expression of a determination to resist. Norman 
Spaulding goes farther, exploring law not only as consciousness, but particularly as 
inevitably the consciousness of the subject who resists. The subject, in this case, is 
variously the subject of power and the subject of the crown, the subject as 
opposed to the object. But always the subject of the account is one who resists—
resists power, resists law, resists analysis—and thus law figures as both 
consciousness and consciousness of resistance and as one of the things that the 
subject resists. Spaulding begins with the French Revolution, which was for a long 
time, and remains for many, the paradigmatic moment of resistance and the 
beginning of modern Western legal history. But he, exhibiting the habit of any 
good historian who wants to dig deeper, cannot resist going back further in time 
to J.G.A. Pocock’s account31 of the sixteenth-century dispute over the concepts of 
law being custom from “time out of mind”; law as ancient custom figures here as 
simultaneously a resistance to monarchical authority and resistance to the idea of 
 
30.  Christopher W. Schmidt, Conceptions of Law in the Civil Rights Movement, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 641, 652–58 (2011). 
31.  Spaulding, supra note 6, at 687 (quoting J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION 
AND THE FEUDAL LAW 33 (1987)). 
Assembled_Issue_3 v5 (Do Not Delete) 2/22/2012  9:07 AM 
532 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  1:3 
 
history as change. 
Spaulding’s article is, on the surface, an inquiry into the ways in which 
psychoanalytic and Hegelian theory suggest that law and history are inextricably 
intertwined. “‘Only in a State cognizant of laws,’ [Hegel] argued, ‘can distinct 
transactions take place, accompanied by such a clear consciousness of them as 
supplies the ability and suggests the necessity of an enduring record.’”32 If the 
whole project of sociolegal history is to insist that we must ask more than just 
what the law was in the past, or to make a chronological list of events and 
speculate about the path from one point to another on the timeline, then we need 
to think about how we know what we say about why people did things, what they 
thought, and what difference it made to the people who experienced it. To do that, legal 
historians must grapple with the problem of consciousness and not merely what 
people knew and thought about law. Law was what they knew and thought and, 
most frustratingly for those in the legal history trade, our own consciousness. 
 
Law as Enchanted Ritual and as Spectacle 
Law is a somewhat organized form of behavior that derives its significance 
from being observed. While it must be observed, unlike other practices that derive 
most or all of their meaning from being observed (religious rituals, theater, 
performance art), it must be believed to be even when it is not observed. A 
spectacle is a spectacle because it has spectators. The first sentence of Spaulding’s 
essay is explicitly cinematic: “The first scene always includes a shot of the corpus 
delicti,” and he immediately invites the reader to imagine beheaded corpses, 
guillotines, and the ghost in Hamlet.33 Peter Goodrich’s first sentence is also 
visual: “It all begins with the apparition of a specter,” but he then leads the reader 
to envision books.34 In an account of law as “a theater that denies its theatricality, 
an order of images that claims invisibility, a series of performances that desire to 
be taken as the dead letter of prose and so the dead hand of the law,”35 Goodrich 
also locates the origin of the absence of the visual in the Protestant Reformers’ 
“critique of images in favor of writing,” and their critique of Catholicism’s 
emphasis on ceremony and spectacle at the expense of reason, unmediated reading 
of scripture, and belief.36 Wilf, Constable, and Goodrich all insist on the 
importance of words to law. A huge amount of U.S. constitutional law 
 
32.  Spaulding, supra note 6, at 684 (quoting GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 61 (J. Sibree trans., Dover Publ’n 1956)(1837) and citing HAYDEN WHITE, 
THE CONTENT OF THE FORM: NARRATIVE DISCOURSE AND HISTORICAL REPRESENTATION 12 
(1987)). 
33.  Spaulding, supra note 6, at 677. 
34.  Peter Goodrich, Specters of Law: Why the History of the Legal Spectacle Has Not Been Written, 1 
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 773, 773 (2011). 
35.  Id. at 811. 
36.  Id. at 775. 
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scholarship, including constitutional historical writing, focuses on the question of 
interpretation of texts and the relative authority of current readers, past readers, 
lay readers, and judicial readers (among others) to say “what the law is.”37 For all 
the emphasis on the meaning of the text, there is relatively little emphasis on the 
text itself. Law in the United States and, Goodrich’s opening example suggests, in 
Britain too, “is subject to a pragmatic ethos that is distinctly adiaphoristic.”38 That 
pragmatic ethos, and his interest in the relationship of the congregant to the 
officiant as the spectator to the authority, leads to his opening example: a message 
encrypted in the typeface of an English Court of Chancery judgment in a 
copyright infringement suit against the author and publisher of The Da Vinci Code, 
and Goodrich has great fun exploring angles on the Court of Appeals’ decision 
condemning the judgment as “not easy to read or to understand.”39 Constable and 
Goodrich remind us that text itself is not just a portal to meaning, it is a social act. 
It deserves its own sociolegal history. 
Barbara Welke makes the point more explicit by writing the history of 
products liability law as a drama in which the very form of legal history 
scholarship becomes the narrative form of a play: a tragedy in two acts. Assuring 
the reader that the project is no mere thought experiment, Welke’s foreword tells 
us that the prologue and the first scene of the play were performed for an 
audience at an academic conference in the autumn of 2010.40 The incidents that 
gave rise to litigation—children wearing highly flammable costumes or pajamas 
were burned to death—become part of the drama and remind the reader that 
liability rules should not be abstracted from the suffering of the people whose 
resort to law produced the rules. The dramatic form reminds the reader of the 
horrible suffering of the children and their families. The ghost of Welke’s own 
daughter Frances, who died suddenly at the age of eighteen, just days after this 
symposium, hovers over the tragedy Welke writes, reminding us of the unbearable 
heartbreak of the sudden death of a child. Welke’s decision to write the history of 
products liability law as a play in which children die is, to some of us, the most 
powerful possible methodological choice one could make to remind us that the 
history of law is full of sorrows greater than many of us will ever know. And those 
of us who find insight in her work can be grateful for Welke’s courageous 
determination to persist in writing the play in the months after Frances died. 
The rhetorical choices Welke makes in constructing her drama echo Bertolt 
Brecht. She writes of a modern tragedy and then, at the end, her character 
 
37.  Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty 
of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
38.  Goodrich, supra note 34, at 812.  Adiaphoristic is defined in the Oxford English 
Dictionary as relating to “religious or theological indifference; indifferentism, latitudinarianism.” 1 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 153 (2 ed. 1989). 
39.  Goodrich, supra note 34, at 773–74, (quoting Baigent & Leigh v. Random House, [2007] 
EWCA (Civ) 247, [3], (Eng.)). 
40.  Welke, supra note 12, at 693–95. 
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addresses the reader, perhaps in an effort to shock us out of the complacency of 
just being an observer. We are all part of the drama, and how the story ends is a 
choice that we all make. Bertolt Brecht ends The Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui, his play 
about the rise and fall of a murderous dictator, with the actor who plays the title 
character walking forward on the stage, removing his Hitler-esque moustache, and 
speaking directly to the audience: 
If we could learn to look instead of gawking, 
We’d see the horror in the heart of farce, 
If only we could act instead of talking, 
We wouldn’t always end up on our arse. 
This was the thing that nearly had us mastered; 
Don’t yet rejoice in his defeat, you men! 
Although the world stood up and stopped the bastard, 
The bitch that bore him is in heat again.41 
By breaking down the barrier between actor and audience, Brecht insists that 
the fight against evil is never over and that justice in the future will depend on 
whether we look instead of gawking and act instead of talking. Similarly, Welke’s 
narrator, knowing what she knows about the law of products liability, reminds us 
that the comforts of our contemporary life—comforts enabled by the mass 
consumption economy—are in many cases also hazards. Whether the processes of 
law succeed in protecting us against danger is ultimately up to each of us. The 
liability law may force a company to pay damages to those injured or to the estates 
of those killed by the hazardous product, but the heartbreak and pain of injury and 
death can never be shifted to the company. The cozy chenille bathrobe purchased 
or received as a gift may be a fire hazard. So what should I do? (implicitly, what 
would you do?), the narrator asks, after reading the label warning that the robe is 
flammable: “Should I wear it? . . . Should I send it back?” And then, the possible 
tragedy as the narrator succumbs to temptation: “Some day, when I just can’t get 
warm, I imagine I’ll put it on.”42 And the tragedy will repeat again. 
Religious ritual is often meant to be observed, in the sense of ritually 
followed or adhered to in a prescribed method, and in the sense of being observed 
by a congregation who participate in the ritualized behavior. Shai Lavi offers an 
account of nineteenth-century German-Jewish legal history that disputes the 
tendency since Weber to contrast the pre-modern past, in which religion was 
pervasive, with the secular present, and to suggest that law was enchanted in the 
past and is rational, secular, and disenchanted now.43 Rather, Lavi argues, the 
 
41. BERTOLT BRECHT, THE RESISTABLE RISE OF ARTURO UI 128 (1972). 
42.  Welke, supra note 12, at 762. 
43.  Shai J. Lavi, Enchanting a Disenchanted Law: On Jewish Ritual and Secular History in Nineteenth-
Century Germany, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 813, 816 (2011) (citing Max Weber, Religious Rejections of the 
World and Their Directions, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 323 (H.H. Gerth & C. 
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secular age invented the notion of the enchanted religious past even as it invented 
the idea of the secular present. Thus, enchantment and disenchantment exist side 
by side, and in the nineteenth century, Germans ritualized certain Jewish practices 
(including burial, animal slaughter, and circumcision), rendering Jewish law as 
exotic, alien, and supernatural. The ritualization of Jewish halacha ultimately 
transformed the way that observant Jews themselves described or experienced 
their practices, making what was once done for educational or ontological reasons 
into practices that had symbolic meaning.44 Lavi contends not merely that Weber’s 
modernization-secularization thesis is only half the story, and that German state 
law played a role in the secularization of segments of the Jewish community (the 
rise of the Reform movement), but also that German state law played a role in 
increasing the symbolism and enchantment that orthodox Jews attributed to 
longstanding practices. Lavi also makes the case for studying law just as law: not 
“law as . . .” or “law and” or law as rules, but simply the meditative quality of 
practice. Taking a cue from the value of observance for its own sake, he suggests 
“that a focus on the minute details of legal practice was a dominant alternative to a 
search for meaning, whether enchanted or disenchanted.”45 
The power of law to enchant is magical. Law can make the state, and the 
coercive power exercised by people in the name of the state, seem to disappear. 
The critical and social histories of the last three decades, and the wave of work on 
postcolonial studies, remind us that the history of American law, and of colonial 
law all over the world, is a history of mass killings, expropriation of land, 
suppression of populations, destruction of cultures, systematized subordination of 
entire classes of people, all done under the auspices of claimed government 
authority. The outrageousness of this violence disappears under various forms of 
delegated sovereignty and presumed consent that are legitimated by law. To make 
that much killing and expropriation seem to be the exercise of legitimate sovereign 
authority—to make it seem the process of state-building, as it has lately come to 
be called—takes quite a sleight of hand. Law is a very adept magician. 
 
Law as Sovereignty 
The power of law as a form of enchanted spectacle is considerable precisely 
because it obscures the equally considerable power of law as sovereignty. Law, in 
this account, is a mechanism by which government authority is asserted over 
people, or some people claim in the name of government the power to control 
others. Law is not merely sovereignty, it is delegated sovereignty. Assaf 
Likhovski’s paper offers a bridge between thinking of law as a particular form of 
 
Wright Mills, eds. & trans., 2001) (1946)). 
44. Id. at 826. 
45. Id. at 842. 
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ritualized interaction and law as sovereignty. He begins with the image of law as a 
dybbuk—an  enchantment, a wandering spirit possessing a living body—and then, 
like a wandering spirit himself, Likhovski flies us through time and space. First he 
takes us to a community of kabbalists and miracle workers in contemporary Israel 
who sell their paranormal insights on water, diamonds, and finance, and then to 
the complex colonial regime of Palestine during the British Mandate, and then 
further back in time to late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Britain where 
a debate over the income tax figures the tax as an “ominous, all-knowing spirit 
haunting every Englishman.”46 By linking contemporary Israeli debates over tax 
policy with Mandate Palestine, Likhovski links the governance of an aspect of 
spirituality in the present with the long process of Israeli state-building in the past. 
The complex and multilayered tension between religious and secular claims to 
authority that pervade Israel today, as reflected in the dispute over tax policy for 
kabbalists (including his own implicit skepticism about the basis for the claim of 
the taxpayer that religious tradition should exempt his substantial earnings from 
taxation), are linked textually in his article with his account of the spiritual 
meaning of taxation in the context of political culture. Likhovski reminds us that 
sovereignty, as reflected in the power to govern, including the power to tax people 
and territory, is a deeply meaningful social construct. 
Law as sovereignty or governance has often been expressed in terms of 
power to control land and its plant and animal inhabitants. More abstractly, at 
least in the New World, Europeans saw law as sovereignty over what they called 
territory, and they envisioned territory as sparsely populated land that offered 
possibilities for future riches. Paul Frymer, Mariana Valverde, and Ritu Birla all 
explore law not merely as a modality of colonial governance, though it is that. 
More interestingly and less obviously, they show that the way law defines and 
implements government power redefines the European conception of the 
European governors and the very nature of governmental or sovereign power in a 
nearly magical way. John Witt explores the law of war as a modality of governance 
with a particular focus on the rules for armed conflict, where warfare usually 
involves conflict over competing claims to governance.47 All of them see law as 
the legitimation of exercises of power over land and people and, in particular, as 
the way in which conquering peoples used law to convince themselves of the 
justice of the subjugation of people. 
Valverde finds in litigation over aboriginal land rights in Canada a process of 
“refurbishing the Crown for a multicultural age.”48 The law’s role in this process 
of redefining the meaning of sovereignty is magical: judges, like shamans, 
 
46. Assaf Likhovski, Chasing Ghosts: On Writing Cultural Histories of Tax Law, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 843, 883–84 (2011). 
47. Witt, supra note 13. 
48. Mariana Valverde, “The Honour of the Crown is at Stake:” Aboriginal Land Claims Litigation and 
the Epistemology of Sovereignty, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 955, 965 (2011). 
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“conjur[e] sovereignty,” through a “wholly magical invocation of the Crown’s 
inherent virtues.”49 In her analysis, we see that law’s magic, like the spiritual power 
of religion, works substantially through the power of words and the even greater 
power of words placed into text by judges. The ritually repeated incantation of a 
concept (“the honour of the Crown”50) by men in black robes ultimately gives an 
air of reality to a contestable proposition. Exploring a judge’s assertion that the 
purpose of a Canadian constitutional provision is to effect the “reconciliation of 
the prior occupation of North America by distinctive aboriginal societies with the 
assertion of Crown sovereignty,”51 Valverde reveals that the assertion as fact of 
that which should be taken as a contested question is at the core of the law of 
aboriginal land rights in Canada. The symbolism of the term “honour of the 
Crown”—which is enhanced by using the antiquated term Crown rather than 
“government”—legitimates a power grab that was, as she points out, never 
sanctified by Europeans defeating aboriginal people in war. Although she does not 
explore why defeat in war should be relevant to the legitimacy of the power grab, 
as we shall see, reading this passage of Valverde’s paper alongside Witt’s sheds 
light on how law defines some violent seizures of land and people to be legal and 
others not. 
Whereas Valverde’s analysis of sovereignty focuses directly on the sovereign, 
for Frymer, law operates as an instrument of aggressive imperial expansion 
through various forms of mostly inconspicuous and delegated sovereignty. 
European, colonial, and later state governments engaged in empire building 
through exercising their power to legalize, ratify, and clothe with legitimate 
authority, thereby granting, delegating, or immunizing the actions of those who 
were not officially officers of the government. These actions were taken with 
respect to control of land, and the government and private empire-building 
project brutally forced the native inhabitants of the land into migration or death. 
As Morris Cohen—an earlier generation of law and society scholar—put it, 
property is sovereignty.52 Law in the Cohen/Frymer formulation is the delegation 
of state power and government resources to nominally private parties, the 
landowners. The legitimation function of the delegated sovereignty that operated 
as the private law of property was the means by which a state with relatively little 
centralized administrative apparatus was able to extend its reach over vast 
territory. Letters of marque, land grants, licenses to collect user fees, the right to 
determine boundaries, and charters to business corporations were all forms of 
delegated sovereignty that not only enabled European domination of territory but 
also enabled horrifying acts of killing, expropriation, and brutality with no 
 
49. Id. at 957. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 972 (quoting Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, paras. 81, 141 
(Can.)); see also R. v. Van der Peet, [1996], 2 S.C.R. 507, para. 31 (Can.)). 
52. Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927). 
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accountability and no effective limits or controls. 
Law is often imagined (especially in the self-congratulatory bombast of 
lawyers) as being the very antithesis of warfare. Law is civilized and peaceful 
dispute resolution; war is a brutal and violent hell. War happens when law fails. 
Yet, as John Witt’s essay points out, law has been deeply entwined with the 
conduct of war for centuries and theorists of war have long delved in the fields of 
law for justification and guidance. Witt contrasts two contemporary accounts—
what he calls the two master narratives—of the legal history of the laws of war: a 
declension thesis (holding that the United States once respected the international 
law of warfare and no longer does) and a novelty thesis (holding that law has 
never been more involved than now in shaping the American conduct of war).53 
He argues that both theses are “deeply wrong, and based in a set of assumptions 
that bespeak the scholarly poverty of the field.”54 Arguing for the centrality of the 
cultural contestation that took place over the law of war in the Indian Wars of the 
colonial era, in the military academies, and over the militia in the antebellum 
period, between Alexander Hamilton and other statesmen of the founding era, 
and in the dispute over slavery, to name a few, Witt suggests that we 
reconceptualize the laws of war as a forum in which “legal discourse . . . 
animate[d] and shape[d] the ethical consideration of means and ends in warfare 
over . . . a long time period” covering “some of the gravest moments in American 
history.”55 Witt is perhaps not striving to revolutionize the theoretical framework 
for historiography; his considerable ambition is to enrich the historiography of the 
law of war and to peek through the window of the law of war at the nature of the 
history of law. 
In Likhovski, Witt, Frymer, and Valverde we see the magical power of law at 
work. The magical power of law is to make the state and its exercises of power—
sometimes coercive, sometimes liberatory—disappear. The violence of the law, as 
Robert Cover said,56 disappears when law makes its operations seem to be the 
product of consent, custom, contract, or civilization. The law accomplishes its 
own vanishing when it makes the movement of money, land, or other resources 
seem to be the product of putatively autonomous institutions like the market, the 
employment contract, or the family. 
 
Law as Economic/Cultural Activity 
One of law’s amazing magical disappearing acts has been, over the last two 
centuries at least, to make it seem that the economy exists separately from law. 
 
53. Witt, supra note 13, at 898–901. 
54. Id. at 898. 
55. Id. at 911. 
56. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986). 
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While contemporary law and economics scholars, in company with political 
analysts and World Bank and International Monetary Fund officials, point out that 
the rule of law is necessary to, or at least helps support, efficient economies, the 
notions that law is distinct from economy, that the law may be necessary to a 
healthy economy but is not the economy, and that the law does things to the 
economy are so widespread as to seem indisputable. And, yet, the autonomy of 
the economy is a notion that has been disproved, debunked, and demolished so 
many times, using so many examples, and so effectively that one wonders why any 
educated person can still entertain it with a straight face. Of course, one of the 
core insights of legal history since Hurst and Horwitz has been that legal regimes 
facilitate particular economic arrangements and distributions of wealth and that 
people who are motivated largely by the desire to amass fortunes have been 
influential creators of the tapestry of law for centuries. The two final essays in this 
issue, along with parts of others, remind us that the relation of law to economy 
should not be seen just as a conjoining of two distinct social institutions (law and 
economy or laws and money) but that law is at the core of any activity or 
relationship of social life that might be characterized as being part of the 
economy—not just buyer/seller, borrower/lender, but also the fundamentals 
themselves: currency, capitalism, corporation, and commerce. 
Roy Kreitner argues that law was “a central component” of the political and 
economic arguments over the gold standard in the United States in the 1890s. He 
identifies law both as a political argument over the power of government and as a 
debate among economists about money, trade, and technological change. Those 
advocating reliance on silver to value money considered that “the primacy of 
government in the money system was a relatively plain fact.” Gold advocates, by 
contrast, thought “international markets circumscribed the possibilities for 
wielding government power” and believed commerce, not law, was the “directing 
force for economic conditions.”57 Kreitner finds in 1890s monetary policy the 
origins of the modern figuration of economics which “conceives law as the 
backdrop against which money is the facilitator of completely individualized 
action, as it were banishing the collective and its politics from the money 
equation.”58 Kreitner’s argument not only illustrates the way law was imbricated in 
money, but also makes a number of historiographic points, including that 
progressive historians who looked back at populist debates about gold and silver 
tended to erroneously pass off their own views on monetary policy (that populists 
were well-intentioned but mistaken in supposing that a silver standard would help 
unemployed laborers or debt-ridden farmers) as economic verities.59 The debate 
over monetary policy not only produced the gold standard, but, more importantly, 
 
57. Roy Kreitner, Money in the 1980s: The Circulation of Politics, Economics and Law, 1 U.C. IRVINE 
L. REV. 975, 989–91 (2011). 
58. Id. at 1010. 
59. Id. at 993. 
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it granted economics its position of structural objectivity and scientific expertise 
and its divorce from politics, and also established the idea that money is “an issue 
to be determined by economics and away from politics.”60 
Where Kreitner allows us to see money, even gold, as a form of congealed 
law, Ritu Birla shows us economic man (market actors) and markets themselves as 
law. Reading Foucault 61 and colonial Indian experiences, she argues that the even 
the most foundational elements of a market economy—the “economic man” (the 
individual, intentional actor in the market), the family (as a business association), 
and even the market in India—were legal constructs, as were the more familiar 
constructs of economic life that later became normalized as social facts, including 
corporations as persons and contracts as natural social behavior. The Indian 
Companies Act of 1882 established the limited liability joint-stock company as the 
model for commercial organization in India under British colonial rule and 
insisted that indigenous business associations “be regulated by the Hindu or 
Muslim personal law governing families and religio-cultural practice” which, she 
says, governed vernacular capitalism “first and foremost as cultural, rather than as 
economic mechanism.”62 This feature of colonial law “institutionalized a 
disjuncture between economy, a public and ethical project, and culture, a private 
one,” which was later embraced as “cultural formations, bound to age-old 
tradition.”63 Reading Birla together with Likhovski, we see the complex ways in 
which British laws relating to money, taxation, and finance were used in different 
colonial regimes (India during the Raj and British Mandate Palestine) to create 
cultural constructs which, in later years, were reinvented as supposedly age-old 
traditions that were older than, and autonomous from, law rather than, as they 
show, a product of it. 
 
*  *  * 
 
As Birla says, legal history plays an “important role as empirical mapping of 
the circuits of law’s agency and the legal agency of subjects.”64 The articles in this 
issue map many such circuits by linking texts and communities, individual and 
group consciousness, sacred and secular rituals and spectacles, manifold 
sovereignties and conquests, and the circulation of money and ideas. This 
empirical mapping project of a diversity of people, places, things, and times would 
be a reward unto itself for a reader who simply wants to see ideas in play. The 
articles also invite the reader to join the authors in critical engagement with the 
 
60. Id. at 1012–13. 
61. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE 
FRANCE, 1978–1979 (2010). 
62. Birla, supra note 7, at 1031. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 1035. 
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nature of law and the nature of history. Asking questions about theory and 
method prods those of us who are practitioners of the craft of sociolegal historical 
writing to think about our craft. Thinking about the craft of a critical legal history 
can be pushed into “critical practice itself.” The latter would involve not just 
(Birla’s emphasis) “mapping law’s sites of regulation . . . but also addressing the 
historical production of the market as ethical and political model for self-
regulation, that is auto-nomos, or autonomy, and its appearance and abstraction as 
an a priori logos.”65 
The critical practice embraced by all of these scholars is to see law as cause 
and consequence, as deeply embedded in nearly every aspect of the social and 
intellectual life of people at diverse times and places. Law is not outside life but 
deep within it. Law is so deeply woven into our consciousness that a first step of 
critical practice is to find it at work and challenge the claims that law is external to 
suffering, privation, inequality, and oppression. That the study of legal history can 
have redemptive power seems an article of faith among this generally skeptical 
crowd. In matters of theory and method, the possibilities for sociolegal history are 





65. Id. at 1036. 
